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Abstract   
 
 In 1996, 408,000 Sri Lankan women, nearly 10% of the country’s working-age women, 
worked abroad, many of them in the oil producing countries of the Persian Gulf. In this paper I 
compare the influence of international migration on local hierarchies of class and gender in two 
villages in southern Sri Lanka:  a Sinhala-speaking Buddhist village where I did my doctoral 
dissertation research in 1992-4, and a Tamil-speaking Muslim village where I spent some time 
during the summer of 1997. I discuss the challenges of using ‘class’ as a unit of analysis in a 
non-Western setting where gender identities, family ties, caste solidarity, religious allegiance, 
and ethnic affiliation also shape economic relations. Bringing female domestic servants into the 
global economy revolutionizes local understandings of both class and gender. Although it 
receives recognition as ‘work’, housework and childcare remain ‘women’s work’, and women’s 
internationally accepted gender status as unskilled, ‘supplemental’ family wage earners justifies 
meager salaries for housemaids. High Sri Lankan demand for scarce jobs in West Asia drives 
wages down and agency fees up, keeping housemaids ‘working class’ in the global economy. 
Isolated in the homes of their individual employers, migrant housemaids nevertheless are 
evolving a nascent class consciousness through their struggles with local Sri Lankan middle-
people and through retold stories of conflicts with abusive employers. Religious and ethnic 
differences between the Sinhala and Muslim villages affect the extent of class solidarity. The 
paper investigates how patterns social stratification, such as religious and ethnic practices, caste 
statuses, and gender roles affect the emergence of class identity in two villages in Sri Lanka. 
 
Introduction: 
Grossly unequal distributions of power, wealth, and prestige characterize the global 
economy.i Poverty and lack of jobs for men and women in Sri Lanka drive women overseas to 
work as housemaids in the Middle East. This paper compares migration experiences of women in 
two villages, a Sinhala-speaking Buddhist village where I did my dissertation research in 1992-4, 
and a Tamil-speaking Muslim village where I spent some time during the summer of 1997. I 
argue that family patterns, household dynamics, and local, national and international economics 
influence women’s work experiences. I also argue that patterns of social stratification, such as 
gender roles and religious and ethnic practices, affect class struggle and the emergence of class 
identity.  
 
Migration:  poverty, unemployment, and the international division of labor 
Migration from Sri Lanka to the Middle East started in the mid-1970s when oil prices 
rose world-wide. At first the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) nations in 
the Middle East spent their profits building infrastructure, and many Sri Lankan men went 
abroad to work as carpenters, electricians, masons, and heavy-machinery drivers. When the 
building boom petered out in the early 1980s, the demand for male labor dropped, and families in 
the Middle East began to spend their disposable income to hire domestic servants. In 1996, 
580,000 Sri Lankans worked abroad. Of these, 70% were women, most of whom worked as 
housemaids in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE (SLBFE 1997). These statistics suggest that 
nearly one in ten of the working-age women in Sri Lanka are now employed out of the country. 
While Muslims make up 6% of the Sri Lankan population, Muslim women account for 20% of 
the migrants. Muslim women’s over-representation in the migrant population show the 
importance of studying their experiences.  
 Comparing experiences of women from a Sinhala-speaking Buddhist village and a Tamil-
speaking Muslim village allows me to ask how ethnicity, religious beliefs, and cultural practices 
influence migration and class consciousness. In 1994, the Sinhala village of Naeaegama (Village 
of Relatives) had 138 households with approximately 1000 inhabitants, divided into two main 
castes.ii Over a quarter of the households had or had had a member working abroad, and 90% of 
the migrants were women. The Muslim village of Minigoda (Many Gems) is about 25 miles 
south of Naeaegama, and in 1997 it had 500 households with roughly 3500 inhabitants. At least 
200 people had experience abroad. Minigoda has no caste system of social stratification, but I 
noted a diversity of local rankings in status, wealth, and prestige. In both villages, population 
growth, poverty, and lack of jobs for either men or women make migration an attractive option. 
Most migrant women went abroad on two-year contracts with the goal of buying land, building a 
house, or supporting the daily consumption needs of their families (Brochmann 1987; Gamburd 
1995).  
Over the past twenty years, salaries have gradually dropped, while agency fees have 
increased. In international currencies, women earned about three times as much in 1980 as they 
did in 1994, when they earned about $100 a month. Several international economic dynamics 
caused these changes. In 1985, when oil prices dropped, Arab employers lowered commissions 
paid to job agencies. At the same time, high demand for the limited number of jobs in the Middle 
East created competition between different labor exporting countries, and between agencies in 
Sri Lanka. With seemingly endless supplies of workers hoping to travel abroad, local and 
international agencies offered jobs to those willing to accept the lowest wages. In order to pay 
competitive commissions to Arab recruiters, agencies in Sri Lanka charged higher fees from 
prospective migrants. Agencies bargained away workers’ rights, privileges, and salaries in order 
to secure scarce jobs. On the national front, remittances sent from the Middle East provided a 
major source of foreign exchange. Fearing that host countries will turn to Indonesia and the 
Philippines for cheaper labor, the Sri Lankan government has not actively supported workers’ 
rights. The combination of population growth, unemployment, national policies and international 
economic dynamics shapes men’s and women’s experiences of migration.  
 
Class struggle and class identity 
 Marx discusses social structure in terms of relations of production, relations between 
people and people, and people and things (labor, machinery, and capital). Class emerges where 
the relations of production involve a differentiated division of labor. People with nothing to sell 
besides their labor find themselves at a disadvantage. Marx distinguishes between what laborers 
need to reproduce themselves and their families, and the exchange value of the labor they 
perform. Employers pay laborers less than the value of the work they do, which Marx refers to as 
the expropriation of surplus value. Such exploitation brings about class struggle.  
In speaking about class, Marx distinguishes between ‘class-in-itself’ and ‘class-for-itself’. 
‘Class-in-itself’ refers to relatively objective economic relations of alienation and exploitation. 
Members of such a class, associated by their position in the division of labor, do not have a 
public or individual sense of group identity. Through class struggle, however, workers develop a 
sense of identity and grow into a self-conscious, politically active ‘class-for-itself’ (Marx 1978).  
 Using ‘class’ as a unit of analysis in Sri Lanka requires exploring what ‘class’ means in a 
non-Western setting. A purely Marxist analysis that sees economics as the base of all inequality 
neglects the multiple cross-cutting hierarchies of village life. For example, how does one classify 
the social place and identity of a woman who works abroad for extremely low wages (certainly 
working class in the global economy), of lower caste in the village, yet wealthy by local 
standards? Many individuals and families in both Naeaegama and Minigoda adopt a capitalist, 
individualist, 'Westernized' mindset, deriving status and prestige from wealth and education 
(Srinivas 1962). However, many of the same people also rely on traditional displays (such as 
giving to the temple or contributing to rituals) to mark their social standing. Individuals and 
families position themselves with respect to the multiple intersecting identities and oppressions 
of class, caste, race, and gender, searching to find, and to legitimate, the system offering them the 
most upward (or the least downward) mobility. Social mobility depends not only on progress and 
development within a given system, but also on the relative dominance of different competing 
systems in the village. 
Refining and elaborating on Marx’s insights, recent feminist anthropology examines how 
gender ideology, kinship, and household organization affect global economic processes and 
power structures (Comaroff 1985; Lamphere 1987; Ong 1987). Migration has brought about new 
ways of thinking about women’s work and class identity. Scholars often fail to count female-
gendered tasks as 'work', or to count unpaid housework as 'employment'. The myth of the 
housewife's economic inactivity supports cultural ideologies that devalue women's labor (Collier 
and Yanagisako 1987; Joan Scott 1988). The sale of domestic services on the global market 
forces both rural villagers and social scientists to recognize that the tasks housewives usually 
perform for free in fact make significant contributions to household finances (Sacks 1989).  
In both Naeaegama and Minigoda, female migration changed images of men and women. 
As more and more married women went abroad, proper roles for mothers shifted to include long 
absences from home. Men, bereft of the ‘breadwinner’ role, suffered a challenge to their 
masculinity. In both villages, migrants reported hearing Arabs speculate that “Sri Lankan men 
must be donkeys because they send their women abroad to work.” Images of uneducated, 
slothful husbands suggested that men wasted the money their wives earned abroad. Sinhala 
stereotypes portrayed men turning to alcohol (an exclusively masculine beverage) to drown their 
troubles; in Muslim stereotypes, men did not drink, but smoked, gambled and womanized like 
their Sinhala counterparts. Representations of the delinquent, emasculated men appeared in 
tandem with the images of promiscuous, selfish, pleasure-seeking women who neglected their 
husbands and children.   
Pragmatic migrants and their families countered the prevalent negative stereotypes. They 
described their families’ poverty at home as an inevitable, irresistible, motivating force for their 
migration; citing their economic situation, they stressed their class identity as overshadowing any 
other idealized role. They argued that they remained morally and socially responsible individuals 
despite the migration experience. Supported by much-needed money from abroad, families 
creatively adapted new social configurations in response to women’s migration. Many families 
felt that the unmistakable benefits of migration outweighed the difficulties and problems 
associated with it. New, class-based attitudes and values emerged through slow, difficult, often 
painful negotiations of gender roles and family structures (Gamburd forthcoming).  
Despite the growing recognition that housework is ‘work’, domestic service still does not 
rank as skilled or scarce labor. The common conception that women’s work ‘supplements’ that 
of a male breadwinner often justifies low salaries, even in cases where women actually provide 
the bulk of a family’s income. A steady supply of desperate women willingly take low-prestige, 
poorly paid jobs in order to provide something, no matter how little, for their families (Constable 
1997; Harrison 1997). Marx writes that “The proletarians have nothing to lose but their 
chains”(1971: 107). Analysis of gender and family ties suggests that men and women reach the 
level of having ‘nothing to lose’ at significantly different points (Fernandez-Kelly 1983a, 
1983b). For this reason, a discussion of gender must inform class analysis.  
 
Class struggle and ethnic identity 
Sri Lankan migrant women struggle against exploitation in two arenas: first, in their local 
communities, where middle-people such as job agents and moneylenders seek to siphon off 
profits from migration; and second in their overseas community, where their work is 
appropriated by their employers. I argue that Sinhala women feel more class solidarity than their 
Muslim counterparts because ethnic identity and religious practices influence their respective 
experiences and perceptions of oppression.  
Migration patterns in the Sinhala village of Naeaegama had the potential to rearrange 
older economic hierarchies. At the same time, limited access to start-up capital perpetuated 
unequal class relations. Agencies charged four times more for a job for a man than they did for a 
job for a woman. Rich (often upper caste and upper class) families paid large sums to send men 
abroad to earn generous salaries; poor (often lower caste and lower class) families paid smaller 
sums to send women abroad to earn much more modest wages. Gender, caste and class thus 
influenced migration patterns.  
 Religious and ethnic identity also influenced migration strategies. Due to high demand 
for Muslim housemaids in the Gulf countries, Sri Lankan agencies charged lower fees for 
Muslim women than for Sinhala women.iii Muslim women tended to go abroad through 
registered agencies that provided a number of services to aid and shelter the migrant, while 
Sinhala women tended to go abroad through informal ‘ticket’ arrangements, and many did not 
purchase the supplemental government insurance that automatically accompanies agency jobs.  
Muslims also had an advantage over their Sinhala countrywomen in terms of access to 
credit. Sinhala moneylenders provided ready cash without requiring collateral, thus giving even 
the poorest village women access to jobs abroad. But they charged 100% interest on the loans 
women took to pay job agencies’ placement fees. Poor migrants found the services of 
moneylenders and job agents both crucially important and cripplingly expensive. The middle-
people creamed off the lion’s share of the migrants’ profits. In contrast, the Muslim community 
frowned on charging interest, and many Muslim women obtained loans for little or no charge. 
Percentage-wise more Muslim women than Sinhala women went overseas; they paid less for 
their jobs, they had more job security while abroad; and financially they profited more from their 
work than their Sinhala countrywomen. Ethnicity clearly affected which women went abroad, the 
price, security, and desirability of their jobs, and the amount of profit they could save for 
themselves and their families.  
Although not always conceptualized locally in terms of class struggle, the adversity faced 
by Sinhala women in their dealings with job agents and moneylenders led them to evolve new 
strategies to protect their profits. Formal structures in the Sinhala village of Naeaegama 
positioned the middle-people to take large cuts out of many migrant women's finances. In 1997, I 
noted that more and more women went abroad by way of ‘tickets’ sent through informal female 
networks. By arranging employment for each other, women bypassed the job agents. By 
allowing the recipient of the job to pay the woman who organized it a reasonable ‘finder’s fee’ 
after she started to earn a salary, the women bypassed the moneylenders. Such entrepreneurial 
schemes suggest a self-conscious working class solidarity that may successfully challenge older 
village patterns of wealth, power and poverty. In contrast, in the Muslim village, relatively 
inexpensive job opportunities and interest-free credit give fewer occasions for identity-forming 
struggles.   
Class-for-itself refers to self-conscious working-class identity formed in the crucible of 
class struggle. Unlike unionized shop-floor workers, female domestic servants at work in the 
Middle East rarely have the opportunity to mingle, organize, and discuss their work situations. 
Instead, each works in the relative isolation of her employer’s family, where issues of power, 
hierarchy, and workers’ rights tend to seem like individual, interpersonal matters instead of 
topics for class solidarity and class action. I suggest that a group awareness based on a narrative 
genre of ‘horror stories’ represents a nascent class identity among Sinhala women. Muslim 
women told fewer stories of this sort, perhaps due to the religious tradition they shared with their 
employers. I argue that ‘horror stories’ paradoxically both quell worker rebellion and create a 
sense of solidarity among housemaids.  
The genre of ‘horror stories’ emphasized the many dangers of working abroad and the 
severity of discipline meted out by Arab employers. My fieldwork did not take me to the Gulf 
States, so I can only speculate on relations between stories and real situations. By stressing the 
constructed nature of these stories, I wish in no way to deny the actual incidence of such violent 
events, or to minimize their importance. The images themselves, however, take on a life of their 
own, significantly at odds with the more mundane experiences of most housemaids I spoke with. 
Despite positive or even affectionate relations with their own employers, many women felt the 
need to relate second- and third-hand stories of violent encounters between housemaids and 
sponsors.  
Rumors of violence, fueled by the occasional first-hand experience, can intimidate large 
populations by creating what Michael Taussig calls a 'culture of terror' (1984). ‘Horror stories’ 
circulated an image of employers as strict disciplinarians who meted out sudden and terrible 
justice to erring maids. I asked a manpower recruiting agent if housemaids ever stole from their 
sponsors in Saudi Arabia; he said it never happened, because each housemaid knew that if she 
stole, her sponsors would cut off her hand. Migrant women in Naeaegama related similar stories 
of violent discipline. For example, one woman said that the family across the street from her in 
Kuwait beat their servant and kept her in a dark room without food for three days, because she 
had stolen some jewelry and hidden it in her jar of Nivea Cream. The narrator’s employers 
brought her to see the errant housemaid, and told her to tell everyone that this was the 
punishment for stealing. The narrator analyzed the situation by saying that the Arabs showed 
everyone the punishments given to those caught in error, so that the rest could learn from the 
experience. 
Stories about threats and punishments work to enforce discipline by spreading an image 
of the dominant group as masterful, omniscient, and omnipotent. In James Scott’s terms, the 
powerful overdramatize their reputation in an effort to control the weak (1990:xi-xii). Scott 
questions the extent to which workers actually believe in such inflated reputations, suggesting 
‘hidden transcripts’ that recognize the attempted deception. In this case, I wonder how self-
consciously housemaids challenge images of employer brutality. Whatever their beliefs and 
personal experiences, most Sinhala women related with passion at least one horror story during 
interviews. Perhaps retelling stories about ‘the bad guys’ in a common folk genre allows migrant 
women to create a community through fiction that they cannot easily find in fact.  
Horror stories exemplify hegemony, which is “the lived dominance and subordination of 
particular classes” (Williams 1977:110). While such stories can frighten workers into 
submission, they also create a strong group identity for migrant women. Meillassoux (1981) 
suggests that racism, xenophobia, and discrimination keep guest workers in foreign countries 
afraid and disorganized. Workers think of the issues and problems facing them as questions of 
ethnicity and nationality instead of questions of class. In contrast, I argue that the racist 
stereotype of the abusive Arab employer creates a community of 'survivors' among housemaids, 
providing them with a badge of courage that emphasizes the importance and difficulty of their 
undertaking, above and beyond the menial nature of their work. While domestic service isolates 
household workers and makes class consciousness difficult to achieve, horror stories bring 
women together in a common alliance against the image of the abusive employer. Paradoxically, 
in this case a racist stereotype serves both to discourage resistance and to enhance a 
consciousness and solidarity among housemaids that can function as a channel for nascent class 
awareness.   
 Religious affinity between Muslim women and their Muslim employers seemed to 
mitigate the extent of class solidarity experienced by Muslim migrants due to the circulation of 
horror stories. I asked both Minigoda and Naeaegama residents if they thought that sponsors 
abroad treated Sinhala and Muslim people differently. The Sinhalese felt that the Muslims were 
treated better abroad. Most Muslims claimed equal treatment for both ethnic groups, though 
several informants noted that many Arab people liked Muslim housemaids better than Christian 
or Buddhist ones. From this data, I speculate that Muslim women might receive some advantages 
in their interactions with their sponsors, but that both groups of women remained in a 
subordinate class position in the houses where they worked.   
Religious affinities figured into some Muslim discussions of migration. Though poverty 
motivated most Muslim migrants, one man asserted that his own wife went abroad because she 
wanted to make a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. This same religious tie offered some security to 
Muslim housemaids. Minigoda migrants who encountered trouble with their sponsors asked their 
families to send their employers a letter in Arabic from one of the four local mosques explaining 
the housemaid’s grievance and requesting a solution. Access to religious support gave Muslims a 
degree of leverage unavailable to the average Sinhala maid. Though submerged in other relations 
of power and authority, the shared religious tradition did influence some of the ways Muslims 
thought about migration, and seemed to decrease their sense of class struggle against oppression.  
 
Conclusions 
 This paper has compared the influence of international migration on local hierarchies of 
class and gender in two villages in southern Sri Lanka, the Sinhala-speaking Buddhist village of 
Naeaegama and a Tamil-speaking Muslim village of Minigoda. I discuss the challenges of using 
‘class’ as a unit of analysis in a non-Western setting where gender identities, family ties, caste 
solidarity, religious allegiance, and ethnic affiliation shape economic relations. Bringing female 
domestic servants into the global economy revolutionizes local understandings of both class and 
gender. Although they receive recognition as ‘work’, housework and childcare remain ‘women’s 
work’, and women’s internationally accepted gender status as unskilled, ‘supplemental’ family 
wage earners justifies meager salaries for housemaids. High Sri Lankan demand for scarce jobs 
in West Asia drives wages down and agency fees up, keeping housemaids ‘working class’ in the 
global economy. Isolated in the homes of their individual employers, migrant housemaids 
nevertheless are evolving a nascent class consciousness through their struggles with local Sri 
Lankan middle-people and through retold stories of conflicts with abusive employers. Gender 
ideologies, religious beliefs, and ethnic identity enhance and inhibit the emergence of class 
consciousness in diverse and complex ways. 
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